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Abstract
Despite the pervasiveness of Internet censorship, we have
scant data on its extent, mechanisms, and evolution. Mea-
suring censorship is challenging: it requires continual
measurement of reachability to many target sites from
diverse vantage points. Amassing suitable vantage points
for longitudinal measurement is difficult; existing systems
have achieved only small, short-lived deployments. We
observe, however, that most Internet users access content
via Web browsers, and the very nature of Web site design
allows browsers to make requests to domains with differ-
ent origins than the main Web page. We present Encore,
a system that harnesses cross-origin requests to measure
Web filtering from a diverse set of vantage points with-
out requiring users to install custom software, enabling
longitudinal measurements from many vantage points.
We explain how Encore induces Web clients to perform
cross-origin requests that measure Web filtering, design a
distributed platform for scheduling and collecting these
measurements, show the feasibility of a global-scale de-
ployment with a pilot study and an analysis of potentially
censored Web content, identify several cases of filtering in
six months of measurements, and discuss ethical concerns
that would arise with widespread deployment.
1 Introduction
Internet censorship is pervasive: by some estimates,
nearly 60 countries restrict Internet communication in
some way [36]. As more citizens in countries with histori-
cally repressive governments gain Internet access, govern-
ment controls are likely to increase. Collecting pervasive,
longitudinal measurements that capture the evolving na-
ture and extent of Internet censorship is more important
than ever.
Researchers, activists, and citizens aim to understand
what, where, when, and how governments and organiza-
tions implement Internet censorship. This knowledge can
shed light on government censorship policies and guide
the development of new circumvention techniques. Al-
though drastic actions such as introducing country-wide
outages (as has occurred in Libya, Syria, and Egypt) are
eminently observable, the most common forms of Internet
censorship are more subtle and challenging to measure.
Censorship typically targets specific domains, URLs, key-
words, or content; varies over time in response to chang-
ing social or political conditions (e.g., a national election);
and can be indistinguishable from application errors or
poor performance (e.g., high delay or packet loss). Detect-
ing more nuanced forms of censorship requires frequent
measurement from many varied vantage points.
Unfortunately, consistently and reliably gathering these
types of measurements is extremely difficult. Perhaps the
biggest obstacle entails obtaining access to a diverse, glob-
ally distributed set of vantage points, particularly in the
regions most likely to experience censorship. Achieving
widespread deployment in these locations often requires
surmounting language and cultural barriers and convinc-
ing users to install measurement software. Although re-
searchers have begun to develop custom tools to measure
filtering (e.g., OONI [16, 39], Centinel [9]), widespread
deployment remains a challenge. Instead, researchers
have resorted to informal data collection (e.g., user re-
ports [24]) or collection from a small number of non-
representative vantage points (e.g., PlanetLab nodes [43],
hosts on virtual private networks, or even one-off deploy-
ments of single vantage points) that might not observe the
same filtering that typical users experience.
This paper takes an alternate approach: rather than
ask each user to deploy custom censorship measurement
software, we use existing features of the Web to induce
unmodified browsers to measure Web censorship. Many
users access the Internet with a Web browser, so inducing
these browsers to perform censorship measurements will
enable us to collect data from a larger, more diverse, and
more representative set of vantage points than is possible
with custom censorship measurement tools.
Our system, Encore, uses Web browsers on nearly every
Internet-connected device as potential vantage points for
collecting data about what, where, and when Web filtering
occurs. Encore relies on a relatively small number of Web
site operators (webmasters) to install a one-line embedded
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script that attempts to retrieve content from third-party
Web sites using cross-origin requests [6, 41]. The Encore
script induces every visitor of these modified pages to
request an object from a URL that Encore wishes to test
for filtering. Although same-origin policies in browsers
prohibit many kinds of requests (e.g., to thwart cross-site
request forgery), we demonstrate that the cross-origin
requests that browsers do allow are sufficient to collect
information and draw conclusions about Web filtering. A
major contribution of our work is to show that meaningful
conclusions about Web filtering can be drawn from the
side channels that exist in cross-origin requests.
Encore’s simplicity comes at the cost of significant
limitations on the types of measurements it can collect
and the conclusions we can draw from its measurements.
First, Encore’s measurements must operate within the
constraints of the cross-origin requests that Web browsers
permit. For example, the img HTML directive yields
the most conclusive feedback about whether an object
fails to load, but it can only be used to test images, not
general URLs. This limitation means that while it may be
useful for detecting (say) the filtering of an entire DNS
domain, it cannot test the reachability of specific (non-
image) URLs. Encore’s design must recognize which
cross-origin requests browsers permit and use combina-
tions of these requests to draw inferences with higher
confidence. Second, because Encore requires webmas-
ters to augment their existing Web pages, Encore must
be easy to install and incur minimal performance over-
head on the Web sites where it is deployed. Finally, great
care is required when measuring censorship because ac-
cessing sensitive sites may endanger users in repressive
countries. Our research focuses on Encore’s design and
implementation, and is not a measurement study per se.
Encore can detect whether certain URLs are filtered,
but it cannot determine how they are filtered. Subtle forms
of filtering (e.g., degrading performance by introducing
latency or packet loss) are difficult to detect, and detecting
content manipulation (e.g., replacing a Web page with a
block page, or substituting content) using Encore is nearly
impossible. Thus, Encore may complement other censor-
ship measurement systems, which can perform detailed
analysis but face much higher deployment hurdles. Ulti-
mately, neither Encore nor other censorship analysis tools
can determine human motivations behind filtering, or even
whether filtering was intentional; they only provide data
to policy experts who make such judgments.
2 Related Work
We summarize existing censorship measurement tech-
niques and previous studies of Internet censorship; other
policy reports of Internet censorship (which can ultimately
seed our measurements); and other efforts to perform mea-
surements from clients using advertisements or embedded
images. Although we broadly survey Internet censorship
practices, Encore focuses on Web filtering.
Censorship measurement tools. The prevailing mode
for measuring Internet censorship is to develop custom
measurement software and identify users who are willing
to either install the software or otherwise host a measure-
ment device that runs the software. Existing measure-
ment tools include OONI [16], Centinel [9], and Cens-
Mon [43]. Both OONI and Centinel can be deployed
on end hosts. These tools perform much more detailed
analysis of how censors implement blocking, but to date
both have seen only limited deployment, likely because
they require recruitment of users who are willing to install
and maintain the measurement software. CensMon was
only deployed for a brief period on PlanetLab, a global
network of servers hosted in academic networks; such
measurements are unlikely to be representative, as resi-
dential and mobile broadband networks can face much
different censorship practices than academic and research
networks [33, 47]. At this point, we are not aware of any
censorship measurement system that continuously col-
lects measurements from a global set of vantage points;
this is the gap that Encore aims to fill.
Censorship measurement studies. Several researchers
have performed “first look” studies of censorship in
various countries such as Pakistan [33], Iran [1], and
China [11, 12, 48]. Zittrain et al.’s study of censorship
in China [48] performed Web requests to hundreds of
thousands of sites, but did so from only a handful of di-
alup modems that the authors deployed. Crandall [12],
Clayton [11], and Ensafi [15] exploit symmetric behavior
of the Chinese firewall to measure it from clients outside
China; such measurements are easier to collect than En-
core, but the technique does not work in all countries. The
studies of censorship in Iran and Pakistan were more lim-
ited: the Iran study apparently performed measurements
from a single vantage point for only two months [1], and
the Pakistan study performed measurements from only
five test networks over about two months [33]. Each of
these studies offers a useful snapshot into a country’s filter-
ing practices at a particular point in time, but data collec-
tion is neither widespread nor continuous. The OpenNet
Initiative has conducted the only long-term study to date,
but its data collection is sporadic, making it difficult to
compare filtering practices across countries and time [36].
Sources of block lists. Some policy organizations pub-
lish reports concerning censorship practices around the
world. For example, the Open Network Initiative routinely
publishes qualitative reports based on measurements from
a limited number of vantage points, with scant insight
into how censorship evolves over short timescales or what
exactly is being filtered [37, 38]. Other projects such as
Herdict [24], GreatFire [20], and Filbaan [17] maintain
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lists of domains that may be blocked. Herdict compiles
reports from users about domains that are blocked from
a certain location; such reports lack independent verifi-
cation. GreatFire monitors reachability of domains and
services from a site behind China’s censorship firewall;
it also maintains historical measurement results. Each
tool offers limited information driven by user-initiated
reporting or measurements, yet these services and reports
can serve as initial lists of URLs to test using Encore.
Cross-origin requests for client measurement. Bortz
et al. use timing information from cross-site requests to
infer various information, such as whether a user is logged
into a particular site or whether a user has previously vis-
ited a Web page [5]. Karir et al. use embedded Javascript
with cross-origin requests to measure IPv6 reachability
and performance from large numbers of clients [30]; the
use of embedded cross-origin requests to obtain large
number of clients is similar to Encore’s design. Other
systems have used cross-origin requests to third parties to
determine information such as network latency between
a client and some other Internet destination [21, 34]. In
particular, Casado and Freedman quantified the preva-
lence of clients behind NATs and proxies by delivering
measurement code to clients in a manner very similar to
Encore [8]. Puppetnets exploits weaknesses in browser
security to coerce browsers to unwittingly participate in
denial-of-service attacks [31]. These tools use similar
techniques as Encore, but they primarily aim to measure
network performance or past user behavior based on the
timing of successful cross-origin requests. They do not in-
fer reachability of domains, IP addresses, or URLs based
on the success (or lack thereof) of cross-origin requests.
3 Background
We discuss Web filtering and threats that may interfere
with attempts to measure it. We also explain cross-origin
requests.
3.1 Threat Model
To implement Web filtering, smaller countries often have
centralized traffic filters on a national backbone; larger
countries require each ISP to implement a censorship
policy; some countries, like China, do both [47]. Web
filtering typically takes place when the client performs an
initial DNS lookup (at which point the DNS request may
result in blocking or redirection), when the client attempts
to establish a TCP connection to the Web server hosting
the content (at which point packets may be dropped or
the connection may be reset), or in response to a specific
HTTP request or response (at which point the censor may
reset the TCP connection, drop HTTP requests, or redirect
the client to a block page).
Our goal is to observe instances of Web filtering and
report them to a central authority (e.g., researchers) for
analysis. We assume an adversary that can reject, block,
or modify any stage of a Web connection in order to filter
Web access for subsets of clients, although we assume
the adversary uses a blacklist and is unwilling to filter all
Web traffic, or even significant fractions of all Web traffic.
This adversary influences Encore’s design in three ways:
(1) the main goal of Encore is to measure this adversary’s
Web filtering behavior; (2) the adversary may attempt to
filter clients’ access to Encore itself, thereby preventing
them from collecting or contributing measurements; and
(3) the adversary may attempt to distort Encore’s filtering
measurements by allowing measurement traffic but deny-
ing other access to the same site. This paper considers all
three aspects of the adversary.
3.2 Cross-Origin Requests
Web browsers’ same-origin policies restrict how a Web
page from one origin can interact with resources from
another; an origin is defined as the protocol, port, and
DNS domain (“host”) [41]. In general, sites can send
information to another origin using links, redirects, and
form submissions, but they cannot receive data from an-
other origin; in particular, browsers restrict cross-origin
reads from scripts to prevent attacks such as cross-site
request forgery. However, cross-origin embedding is typi-
cally allowed and can leak some read access. The corner-
stone of Encore’s design is to use information leaked by
cross-origin embedding to determine whether a client can
successfully load objects from another origin.
Various mechanisms allow Web pages to embed re-
mote resources using HTTP requests across origins;
some forms of cross-origin embedding are not subject
to the same types of security checks as other cross-
origin reads. Examples of resources that can be em-
bedded include simple markup of images or other me-
dia (e.g., <img>), remote scripts (e.g., <script>), re-
mote stylesheets (e.g., <link rel="stylesheet"
href="...">), embedded objects and applets (e.g.,
<embed src="...">), and document embedded
frames such as iframes (e.g., <iframe>). Each of these
remote resources has different restrictions on how the
origin page can load them and hence leak different levels
of information. For example, images embedded with the
img tag trigger an onload event if the browser success-
fully retrieves and renders the image, and an onerror
event otherwise. The ability for the origin page to see
these events allows the origin page to infer whether the
cross-origin request succeeded.
Although cross-origin embedding of media provides
the most explicit feedback to the origin about whether
the page load succeeded, other embedded references can
still provide more limited information, through timing
of onload invocation or introspection on a Web page’s
style. Additionally, browsers have different security poli-
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Client
Origin
Web site
Measurement
target
1. Origin serves page to client
containing measurement task
3. Task issues a cross-origin request
for a resource on measurement target
4. Censor may filter
request or response
2. Client renders page and
executes measurement task
Figure 1: Encore induces browsers to collect Web filtering mea-
surements by bundling measurement tasks inside pages served
by an origin Web site.
cies and vulnerabilities; for example, we discovered that
the Chrome browser allows an origin site to load any
cross-origin object via the script tag, which allows
us to conduct a much more liberal set of measurements
from Chrome. One challenge in designing Encore is de-
termining whether (and how) various embedded object
references can help infer information about whether an
object was retrieved successfully.
4 Measuring Filtering with Encore
This section explains how Encore measures Web filtering
using cross-origin requests.
4.1 Overview
Figure 1 illustrates how Encore measures Web filtering.
The process involves three parties: a Web client that acts
as our measurement vantage point; a measurement target,
which is a server that hosts a Web resource that we suspect
is filtered; and an origin Web server, which serves a Web
page to the Web client instructing the client how to collect
measurements. In each page it serves, the origin includes
a measurement task, which is a small measurement col-
lection program that attempt to access potentially filtered
Web resources (e.g., Web pages, image files) from the tar-
get and determine whether such accesses were successful.
The client runs this measurement task after downloading
and rendering the page. The greatest challenge is coping
with browsers’ limited APIs for conducting network mea-
surements, particularly when accessing these resources
requires issuing cross-origin requests.
The scope of Web filtering varies in granularity from
individual URLs (e.g., a specific news article or blog
post) to entire domains. Detecting Web filtering is dif-
ficult regardless of granularity. On one hand, detection
becomes more difficult with increasing specificity. When
specific Web resources are filtered (as opposed to, say, en-
tire domains), there are fewer ways to detect it. Detecting
filtering of entire domains is relatively straightforward
because we have the flexibility to test for such filtering
simply by checking accessibility of a small number of
resources hosted on that domain. In contrast, detecting
filtering of a single URL essentially requires an attempt to
access that exact URL. Resource embedding only works
with some types of resources, which further restricts the
Web resources we can test and exacerbates the difficulty
of detecting very specific instances of filtering.
On the other hand, inferring broad filtering is difficult
because Encore can only observe the accessibility of indi-
vidual Web resources, and such observations are binary
(i.e., whether or not the resource was reachable). Any con-
clusions we draw about the scope of Web filtering must be
inferred from measurements of individual resources. We
take a first-order glimpse at such inferences in Section 4.3
and present a filtering detection algorithm in Section 7.
4.2 Measurement tasks
Measurement tasks are small, self-contained HTML and
JavaScript snippets that attempt to load a Web resource
from a measurement target. Encore’s measurement tasks
must satisfy four requirements: First, they must be able
to successfully load a cross-origin resource in locations
without Web filtering. Tasks cannot use XMLHttpRequest
(i.e., AJAX requests), which is the most convenient way to
issue cross-origin requests, because default Cross-origin
Resource Sharing settings prevent such requests from
loading cross-origin resources from nearly all domains.
Instead, we induce cross-origin requests by embedding
images, style sheets, and scripts across domains, which
browsers typically allow.
Second, they must provide feedback about whether or
not loading a cross-origin resource was successful. Sev-
eral convenient mechanisms for loading arbitrary cross-
origin requests (e.g., the iframe tag) lack a clear way to
detect when resources fail to load, and are hence unsuit-
able for measurement tasks.
Third, tasks must not compromise the security of the
page running the task. Tasks face both client- and server-
side security threats. On the client side, because Encore
detects Web filtering by embedding content from other
origins (rather than simply requesting it, as would be pos-
sible with an AJAX request), such embedding can pose a
threat as the browser renders or otherwise evaluates the
resource after downloading it. In some cases, rendering or
evaluating the resources is always innocuous (e.g., image
files); in other cases (e.g., JavaScripts), Encore must care-
fully sandbox the embedded content to prevent it from
affecting other aspects of Web browsing. Requesting
almost any Web object changes server state, and mea-
surement tasks must take these possible side effects into
account. In some cases, the server simply logs that the
request happened, but in others, the server might insert
rows into a database, mutate cookies, change a user’s
account settings, etc. Although it is often impossible to
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predict such state changes, measurement tasks should try
to only test URLs without obvious server side-effects.
Finally, measurement tasks must not significantly affect
perceived performance, appearance, or network usage.
Below is an example of a simple measurement task
that instructs the Web client to load an image hosted by a
measurement target censored.com:
<img src="//censored.com/favicon.ico"
style="display: none"
onload="submitSuccess()"
onerror="submitFailure()"/>
This task meets the four requirements because it (1) re-
quests an image from a remote measurement target using
the img tag, which is allowed by browser security policy;
(2) detects whether the browser successfully loaded the
image by listening for the onload and onerror events;
(3) trivially maintains security by not executing any code
from resources served by the measurement target; and (4)
preserves performance and appearance by only loading
a very small icon (typically 16× 16 pixels) and hiding
it using the display: none style rule. Appendix A
presents a longer example of a measurement task.
4.3 Inferring Web filtering
A measurement task provides a binary indication of
whether a particular resource failed to load, thus implying
filtering of that specific resource. From collections of
these measurements, we can draw more general conclu-
sions about the scope of filtering, beyond individual re-
sources (e.g., whether an entire domain is filtered, whether
an entire portion of a Web site is filtered, whether certain
keywords are filtered). We must do so with little addi-
tional information about the filtering mechanism. This
section describes how we design sets of measurement
tasks to make these inferences.
There are several ways to test accessibility of cross-
origin Web resources; unfortunately, none of them work
across all types of filtering, all Web browsers, and all
target sites. Instead, we tailor measurement tasks to each
measurement target and Web client. Detecting Web fil-
tering gets harder as the scope of filtering becomes more
specific, so we start with techniques for detecting broad-
scale filtering and work toward more specific filtering
schemes. Table 1 summarizes the measurement tasks we
discuss in this section.
4.3.1 Filtering of entire domains
Encore performs collections of measurement tasks that
help infer that a censor is filtering an entire domain. It
is prohibitively expensive to check accessibility of every
URL hosted on a given domain. Instead, we assume that
if several auxiliary resources hosted on a domain (e.g.,
images, style sheets) are inaccessible, then the entire do-
main is probably inaccessible. Our intuition is that rather
than filtering many supporting resources, an adversary
will more likely filter the entire domain (or at least an
entire section of a site). Fortunately, detecting filtering
of some auxiliary resources is straightforward because
pages often embed them even across origins.
Images. Web pages commonly embed images, even
across origins. Such embedding is essential for enabling
Web services like online advertising and content distribu-
tion networks to serve content across many domains.
Encore attempts to load and display an image file
from a remote origin by embedding it using the <img
src=...> tag. Conveniently, all major browsers invoke
an onload event after the browser fetches and renders
the image, and invoke onerror if either of those steps
fails; the requirement to successfully render the image
means that this mechanism only works for images files
and cannot decide the accessibility of non-image content.
Downloading and rendering an image does not affect user-
perceived performance if the image is small (e.g., an icon),
and measurement tasks can easily hide images from view.
This technique only works if the remote origin hosts a
small image that we can embed.
Style sheets. Web pages also commonly load style sheets
across origins. For example, sites often load common
style sheets (e.g., Bootstrap [4]) from a CDN to boost
performance and increase cache efficiency.
Encore attempts to load a style sheet using the <style
src=...> tag and detects success by verifying that the
browser applied the style specified by the sheet. For
example, if the sheet specifies that the font color for <p>
tags is blue, then the task creates a <p> tag and checks
whether its color is blue using getComputedStyle.
To prevent the sheet’s style rules from colliding with
those of the parent Web page, we load the sheet inside
an iframe. Although some browsers are vulnerable
to cross-site scripting attacks when loading style sheets,
these issues have been fixed in all newer browsers [27].
Style sheets are generally small and load quickly, resulting
in negligible performance overhead.
4.3.2 Filtering of specific Web pages
Governments sometimes filter one or two Web pages (e.g.,
blog posts) but leave the remainder of a domain intact,
including resources embedded by the filtered pages [33].
Detecting this type of filtering is more difficult because
there is less flexibility in the set of resources that Encore
can use for measurement tasks: it must test accessibility
of the Web page in question and cannot generally deter-
mine whether the page is filtered based on the accessibility
of other (possibly related) resources. Testing filtering of
Web pages, as opposed to individual resources, is signifi-
cantly more expensive, complicated, and prone to security
vulnerabilities because such testing often involves fetch-
ing not only the page itself, but also fetching all of that
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Mechanism Summary Limitations
Images Render an image. Browser fires onload if successful. Only small images (e.g., ≤ 1 KB).
Style sheets Load a style sheet and test its effects. Only non-empty style sheets.
Inline frames Load a Web page in an iframe, then load an image embed-
ded on that page. Cached images render quickly, implying
the page was not filtered.
Only pages with cacheable images.
Only small pages (e.g., ≤ 100 KB).
Only pages without side effects.
Scripts Load and evaluate a resource as a script. Chrome fires
onload iff it fetched the resource with HTTP 200 status.
Only with Chrome.
Only with strict MIME type checking.
Table 1: Measurement tasks use several mechanisms to discover whether Web resources are filtered. We empirically evaluate
parameters for images and inline frames in Section 6.
page’s referenced objects and rendering everything. This
means we must be very careful in selecting pages to test.
Many pages are simply too expensive or open too many
vulnerabilities to test. Section 5 discusses the infrastruc-
ture and decision process we use to decide whether a Web
page is suitable for testing.
We present two mechanisms for testing Web filtering
of Web pages, and the limitations of each mechanism:
Inline frames. A Web page can include any other Web
page inside itself using the iframe tag, even across
origins. However, browsers place strict communication
barriers between the inline page and the embedding page
for security, and provide no explicit notification about
whether an inline frame loaded successfully.
Instead, the task infers whether the resource loaded suc-
cessfully by observing timing. It first attempts to load the
page in an iframe; then, after that iframe finishes load,the
task records how long it takes to download and render
an image that was embedded on that page. If rendering
this image is fast (e.g., less than a few milliseconds) we
assume that the image was cached from the previous fetch
and therefore the Web page loaded successfully. This
approach only works with pages that embed objects that
will be cached by the browser and are unlikely to have
been cached from a prior visit to another Web page; for
example, common images like the Facebook’s “thumbs
up” icon appear on many pages and may be in the browser
cache even if the iframe failed to load. This approach can
be expensive because it requires downloading and ren-
dering entire Web pages. Additionally, pages can detect
when they are rendered in an inline frame and may block
such embedding.
Scripts. Web pages often embed scripts across origins,
similarly to how they embed style sheets. For example,
many pages embed jQuery and other JavaScript libraries
from a content distribution network or some other third-
party host [29].
The Chrome browser handles script embedding in a
way that lets us gauge accessibility of non-script resources
from a remote origin. Chrome invokes an onload
event if it can fetch the resource (i.e., with an HTTP
Client
HTTP
 GET 
/foo.h
tml
HTTP GET
 /task.js
HTTP GET /favicon.ico
HTTP GET /submit?result=failure
⋯ <script
 src="
//coor
dinato
r/task
.js"> ⋯
⋯ <img src="//cens
ored.com/f
avicon.ico"
/> ⋯
Collection
server
4
example.com
Origin server
1
Coordination
server
2
censored.com
Target
3
Figure 2: An example of observing Web filtering with En-
core. The origin Web page includes Encore’s measurement
script, which the coordinator decides should test filtering of
censored.com by attempting to fetch an image. The request
for this image fails so the client notifies the collection server.
200 OK response), regardless of whether the resource
is valid JavaScript. In particular, Chrome respects the
X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff header,
which servers use to instruct browsers to prohibit exe-
cution of scripts with an invalid MIME type [2]. Other
browsers are not so forgiving, so we use this task type on
Chrome only. This technique is convenient, but it raises
security concerns because other browsers may attempt
to execute the fetched object as JavaScript. Section 5
describes how we make this decision.
5 Encore Measurement System
This section presents Encore, a distributed platform for
measuring Web filtering. Encore selects targets to test
for Web filtering (§ 5.1), generates measurement tasks to
measure those targets (§ 5.2), schedules tasks to run on
Web clients (§ 5.3), delivers these tasks to clients for exe-
cution (§ 5.4), collects the results of each task (§ 5.5), and
draws conclusions concerning filtering practices based on
the collective outcomes of these tests using the inference
techniques from Section 4.
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Figure 2 shows an example of how Encore induces
a client to collect measurements of Web filtering. The
client visits a Web site http://example.com, whose
webmaster has volunteered to host Encore. This origin
page references a measurement task hosted on a coor-
dination server; the client downloads the measurement
task, which in turn instructs the client to attempt to load
a resource (e.g., an image) from a measurement target
censored.com. This request is filtered, so the client
informs a collection server of this filtering. The remain-
der of this section explains how the origin Web server,
coordination server, and collection server work together
to induce and collect Web filtering measurements.
5.1 Sources of measurement targets
Encore requires a set of potentially filtered Web sites and
resources to test for Web filtering. This list can contain
either specific URLs if Encore is testing the reachability
of a specific page; or a URL pattern denoting sets of URLs
(e.g., an entire domain name or URL prefix) to test the
reachability of a domain or a portion of a Web site. A
small list of likely filtered targets is most useful during
initial stages of deployment when clients of only a few
moderately popular Web sites will likely be contributing
measurements. As adoption increases, a broader set of
targets can increase breadth of measurements. We explore
how to obtain lists in both scenarios.
During initial deployment, Encore relies on third par-
ties to provide lists of URLs to test for Web filtering.
Several organizations maintain such lists. Some sites rely
on per-country experts to curate URLs (e.g., GreatFire
for China [20], Filbaan for Iran [17]), while others crowd-
source list creation and let anyone contribute reports of
Web censorship (e.g., Herdict [24]). Our evaluation in
Section 6 uses a list of several hundred “high value” URLs
curated by Herdict and its partners. Curating accurate and
appropriate lists of potentially censored URLs is beyond
the scope of this paper and an active research area.
If we deploy Encore to many geographically distributed
Web clients and build a large, accurate Web index, we
could instead use Encore clients to verify accessibility
of the entire Web index, which would avoid the need for
specialized lists of measurement targets by instead testing
the entire Web. Regardless of whether Encore curates a
small list of high-value measurement targets or simply
extracts URLs from a large Web index, these URLs and
URL patterns serve as input for Encore’s next stage.
5.2 Generating measurement tasks
Measurement task generation is a three-step procedure
that transforms URL patterns from the list of measure-
ment targets into a set of measurement tasks that can
determine whether the resources denoted by those URL
patterns are filtered for a client. This procedure hap-
pens prior to interaction with clients (e.g., once per day).
Figure 3 summarizes the process. First, the Pattern Ex-
pander transforms each URL pattern into a set of URLs
by searching for URLs on the Web that match the pattern.
Second, the Target Fetcher collects detailed information
about each URL by loading and rendering it in a real Web
browser and recording its behavior in an HTTP Archive
(HAR) file [23]. Finally, the Task Generator examines
each HAR file to determine which of Encore’s measure-
ment task types, if any, can measure each resource and
generates measurement tasks for that subset of resources.
The Pattern Expander searches for URLs that match
each URL pattern. This step identifies a set of URLs
that can all indicate reachability of a single resource; for
example, all URLs with the prefix http://foo.com/
are candidates for detecting filtering of the foo.com
domain. Some patterns are trivial (i.e., they match a single
URL) and require no work. The rest require discovering
URLs that match the pattern. We currently expand URL
patterns to a sample of up to 50 URLs by scraping site-
specific results (i.e., using the site: search operator) from
a popular search engine. In the future, Encore could use
its own Web crawler to explore each pattern.
After expanding URL patterns into a larger set of URLs,
the Target Fetcher renders each URL in a Web browser
and records a HAR file, which documents the set of re-
sources that a browser downloads while rendering a URL,
timing information for each operation, and the HTTP
headers of each request and response, among other meta-
data. We use the PhantomJS [40] headless browser hosted
on servers at Georgia Tech. To the best of our knowledge,
Georgia Tech does not filter Web requests, especially to
the set of URLs we consider in this paper.
Finally, the Task Generator analyzes each HAR file to
determine which subset of resources is suitable for mea-
suring using one of the types of measurement tasks from
Table 1. It examines timing and network usage of each
resource to decide whether a resource is small enough to
load from an origin server without significantly affecting
user experience, then inspects content type and caching
headers to determine whether a resource matches one of
the measurement tasks. The Task Generator is particu-
larly conservative when considering inline frames because
loading full Web pages can severely impact performance
and user experience (e.g., by playing music or videos).
Our prototype implementation excludes pages that load
flash applets, videos, or any other large objects totaling
more than 100 KB, and requires manual verification of
pages before deployment; a future implementation could
apply stricter controls. Refer back to Section 4 for more
information on the requirements for each type of measure-
ment task. Section 6.1 further explores network overhead
of measurement tasks.
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Figure 3: Encore transforms a list of URL patterns to a set of measurement tasks in three steps. A URL pattern denotes a set of URL
(e.g., all URLs on a domain). A HAR is an HTTP Archive [23].
5.3 Scheduling measurement tasks
After generating measurement tasks, the coordination
server must decide which task to schedule on each client.
Task scheduling serves two purposes. First, it enables
clients to run measurements that meet their restrictions.
For example, we should only schedule the script task type
from Table 1 on clients running Chrome. In other cases,
we may wish to schedule additional tasks on clients that
remain idle on an origin Web page for a long time. Sec-
ond, intelligent task scheduling enables Encore to move
beyond analyzing individual measurements and draw con-
clusions by comparing measurements between clients,
countries, and ISPs. For example, a single client in Pak-
istan could report failure to access a URL for a variety of
reasons other than Web filtering (e.g., high client system
load, transient DNS failure, WiFi unreliability). However,
if 100 clients measure the same URL within 60 seconds
of each other and the only clients that report failure are
10 clients in Pakistan, then we can draw much stronger
conclusions about the presence of Web filtering.
5.4 Delivering measurement tasks
After scheduling measurement tasks for execution, En-
core must deliver tasks to these clients, who subsequently
run them and issue cross-origin requests for potentially
filtered Web resources. To collect a significant number
of useful Web filtering measurements, Encore requires
a large client population that is likely to experience a
diversity of Web filtering. Previous censorship measure-
ment efforts require researchers to recruit vantage points
individually and instruct them to install custom software,
which presents a significant deployment barrier [16, 36].
In contrast, Encore recruits a relatively small number of
webmasters and piggybacks on their sites’ existing Web
traffic, instantly enlisting nearly all of these sites’ visitors
as measurement collection agents.
A webmaster can enable Encore in several ways. The
simplest method is to add a single <iframe> tag that
directs clients to load an external JavaScript directly from
the coordination server. The coordination server generates
a measurement task specific to the client on-the-fly. This
method is attractive because it requires no server-side
modifications, aside from a single tag; incurs little server
overhead (i.e., only the extra time and space required to
transmit that single line); and allows the coordination
server to tailor measurement tasks to individual clients in
real time. Unfortunately, this method is also easiest for
censors to fingerprint and disrupt: a censor can simply
block access to the coordination server, which inflicts
no collateral damage. Section 8 discusses ways to make
task delivery more robust to blocking, while Section 6.3
discusses incentives for webmasters to include Encore on
their sites in the first place.
Rather than recruit webmasters ourselves, we have ex-
plored the possibility of purchasing online advertisements
and delivering Encore measurement tasks inside them.
This idea is attractive because online advertising networks
already have established agreements with webmasters to
display content (i.e., by paying webmasters to display
ads.) Ad networks even allow advertisers to target ads to
specific users, which Encore could leverage to measure
censorship in specific countries. Unfortunately for us, this
idea works poorly in practice because most ad networks
prevent advertisements from running custom JavaScript
and loading resources from remote origins, with good
reason; only a few niche ad networks are capable of host-
ing Encore. Even if more networks could serve Encore
measurement tasks, they may not take kindly to perceived
misuse of their service, especially if it leads to network fil-
tering and subsequent loss of revenue in countries wishing
to suppress Encore’s measurements.
5.5 Collecting measurement results
After clients run a measurement task, they submit the
result of the task for analysis. Clients submit the result
of task (i.e., whether the client could successfully load
the cross-origin resource), related timing information (i.e.,
how long it took to load the resource), and the task’s mea-
surement ID. The process of submitting results is similar
to the process that clients use to obtain measurement tasks.
In the absence of interference from the adversary, clients
submit results by issuing an AJAX request containing the
results directly to our collection server. Section 8 dis-
cusses other ways to submit results if the adversary filters
access to the collection server.
6 Feasibility of Encore Deployment
We evaluate the feasibility of deploying Encore based on
early experience with a prototype implementation and
analysis of potential measurement targets. This section
addresses three questions about Encore’s deployment:
(1) whether real Web sites are amenable to filtering detec-
tion using Encore’s measurement tasks, which we ex-
plore with offline analysis of potentially-filtered Web
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sites; (2) whether users visit origin sites, run measure-
ment tasks, and collect measurements, which we estimate
using analytics data collected from a likely site of Encore
deployment; (3) if webmasters will install Encore, which
we study in terms of webmaster incentives and estimated
deployment costs.
6.1 Are sites amenable to Encore’s tasks?
This section investigates whether real Web sites host re-
sources that Encore’s measurement tasks can use to mea-
sure filtering. We evaluate the feasibility of using Encore
to measure filtering of both entire domain names and indi-
vidual URLs. To measure filtering practices, we use a list
of domains and URLs that are “high value” for censorship
measurement according to Herdict and its partners [25];
most sites are either perceived as likely filtering targets
in many countries (e.g., because they are affiliated with
human rights and press freedom organizations) or would
cause substantial disruption if filtered (e.g., social media
like Twitter and YouTube). This list contains over 200
URL patterns, of which only 178 were online when we
performed our feasibility analysis in February 2014.
We collect data for this set of experiments by running
the first two stages of the pipeline in Figure 3, which uses
the Pattern Expander to generate a list of 6,548 URLs
from the 178 URL patterns in our list, then collect HAR
files for each URL using the Target Fetcher. We then
send these HAR files to a modified version of the Task
Generator that emits statistics about sizes of accepted
resources and pages.
Filtering of entire domains. We explore whether Encore
can measure filtering of each of the 178 domains on the
list we generated as described above. Recall from Sec-
tion 4.3 that we can use either images or style sheets to
observe Web filtering of an entire domain; for simplicity,
this analysis only considers images, although style sheets
work similarly. We can measure a domain using this
technique if (1) it contains images that can be embedded
by an origin site and (2) those images are small enough
not to significantly affect user experience. We explore
both of these requirements for the 178 domains in our
list. Because our implementation expands URL patterns
using the top 50 search results for that pattern, we will
be analyzing a sample of at most 50 URLs per domain.
Most of these domains have more than 50 pages, so our
results are a lower bound of the amenability of Encore to
collect censorship measurements from each domain.
Figure 4 plots the distribution of the number of images
that each domain hosts. 70% of domains embed at least
one image, and almost all such images are less than 5 KB.
Nearly as many domains embed images that fit within a
single packet, and a third of domains have hundreds of
such images. Even if we conservatively restrict measure-
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Figure 4: Distribution of the number of images hosted by each
of the 178 domains tested, for images that are at most 1 KB, at
most 5 KB, and any size. Over 60% of domains host images that
could be delivered to clients inside a single packet, and a third
of domains have hundreds of such images to choose from.
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Figure 5: Distribution of page sizes, computed as the sum of
sizes of all objects loaded by a page. This indicates the network
overhead each page would incur if a measurement task loaded
it in a hidden iframe. Over half of pages load at least half a
megabyte of objects.
ment tasks to load images less than 1 KB, Encore can
measure Web filtering of over half of the domains.
Filtering of specific Web pages. We explore how often
Encore can measure filtering of individual URLs by load-
ing a Web page in an iframe and verifying that the browser
cached embedded resources from that page. We can use
this mechanism to measure filtering of pages that (1) do
not incur too much network overhead when loading in a
hidden iframe and (2) embed cacheable images.
We first study the expected network overhead from
loading sites in an iframe. Figure 5 plots the distribution
of page sizes for each URL, where the page size is the
sum of sizes of all resources a page loads and is a rough
lower bound on the network overhead that would be in-
curred by loading each page in a hidden iframe (protocol
negotiation and inefficiencies add further overhead). Page
sizes are distributed relatively evenly between 0–2 MB
with a very long tail. Our prototype only permits measure-
ment tasks to load pages smaller than 100 KB, although
future implementations might tune this bound to a client’s
performance and preferences.
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Figure 6: Distribution of the number of cacheable images
loaded by pages that require at most 100 KB of traffic to load,
pages that incur at most 500 KB of traffic, and all pages. Per-
haps unsurprisingly, smaller pages contain fewer (cacheable)
images. Over 70% of all pages cache at least one image and
half of all pages cache five or more images; these numbers drop
considerably when excluding pages greater than 100 KB.
We then evaluate whether these sites embed content
that can be retrieved with cross-origin requests. Figure 6
shows the distribution of the number of cacheable images
per URL for pages that are at most 100 KB, at most
500 KB, and any size. Nearly 70% of pages embed at
least one cacheable image and half of pages cache five or
more images, but these numbers drop significantly when
restricting page sizes. Only 30% of pages that are at most
100 KB embed at least one cacheable image.
Encore can measure filtering of upwards of 50% of
domains depending on the sizes of images, but fewer
than 10% of URLs when we limit pages to 100 KB. This
finding supports our earlier observation in Section 4.3 that
detecting the filtering of individual Web resources may
be significantly more difficult than detecting the filtering
of entire domains.
6.2 Who performs Encore measurements?
Encore requires clients to visit the Web sites that are
hosting Encore scripts. The demographics of clients who
perform Encore measurements is closely related those
who visit a participating Web site. To evaluate whether a
typical Web site will receive measurements from enough
locations, we examined demographic data collected by
Google Analytics for the home page of a professor in
February 2014 [18].
The site saw 1,171 visits during course of the month.
Most visitors were from the United States, but we saw
more than 10 users from 10 other countries, and 16% of
visitors reside in countries with well-known Web filter-
ing policies (India, China, Pakistan, the UK, and South
Korea), indicating that dispatching measurement tasks to
sites such as academic Web pages may yield measure-
ments from a variety of representative locations. Of these
visitors, 999 attempted to run a measurement task; we
confirmed nearly all of the rest to be automated traffic
from our campus’ security scanner. We also found that
45% of visitors remained on the page for longer than 10
seconds, which is more than sufficient time to execute at
least one measurement task and report its results. The
35% of visitors who remained for longer than a minute
could easily run multiple measurement tasks.
Our small pilot deployment of Encore is representa-
tive of the sites where we can expect Encore to be de-
ployed in the short term. Although adoption of Encore by
even a single high-traffic Web site would entirely eclipse
measurements collected by these small university deploy-
ments, grassroots recruitment remains necessary: Encore
relies on a variety of origin sites to deter an adversary
from simply blocking access to all origins to suppress
our measurement collection. Section 8 discusses further
mechanisms for deterring filtering of Encore’s origin sites
and backend infrastructure.
6.3 Will webmasters install Encore?
Encore cannot directly target specific demographics for
measurement collection—the measurements that we col-
lect arise from the set of users who happen to visit a
Web site that has installed an Encore script. If the sites
that host Encore are globally popular (e.g., Google), then
Encore can achieve an extremely widespread sampling
of users; on the other hand, if the sites are only popular
in particular regions, the resulting measurements will be
limited to those regions.
Recruiting webmasters to include Encore’s measure-
ment scripts should be feasible. First, installing Encore
on a Web site incurs little cost. Serving these scripts to
clients adds minimal network overhead; our prototype
adds only 100 bytes to each origin page and requires no
additional requests or connections between the client and
the origin server. Measurements themselves have little
effect on the Web page’s perceived performance because
they run asynchronously after the page has loaded and
rendered. However, they do incur some network overhead
to clients when loading cross-origin resources, which
may be undesirable to users with bandwidth caps or slow,
shared network connections. As Section 6.1 explained,
measurement tasks that detect filtering of a domain (i.e.,
by loading small images) incur overheads that are usually
an insignificant fraction of a page’s network usage.
Second, we see two strong incentives for webmasters
to participate in Encore. Many webmasters may support
Encore simply out of greater interest in measuring Web
filtering and encouraging transparency of government cen-
sorship. The grassroots success of similar online freedom
projects (e.g., Tor [13]) in recruiting volunteers to host
relays and bridges suggests that such a population does ex-
ist. For further incentive, we could institute a reciprocity
agreement for webmasters: in exchange for installing our
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measurement scripts, webmasters could add their own site
to Encore’s list of targets and receive notification about
their site’s availability from Encore’s client population.
7 Measurements
We confirm the soundness of Encore’s measurement tasks
with both controlled experiments and by comparing our
ability to confirm cases of Web filtering with independent
reports of filtering from other research studies. We have
implemented and released every component of Encore
described in Section 5 and have collected seven months
of measurements from May 2014 through January 2015.
To date, at least 17 volunteers have deployed Encore
on their sites, although the true number is probably much
higher; 3/4 of measurements come from sites that elect to
strip the Referer: header when sending results. We
recorded 141,626 measurements from 88,260 distinct IPs
in 170 countries, with China, India, the United Kingdom,
and Brazil reporting at least 1,000 measurements, and
more than 100 measurements from Egypt, South Korea,
Iran, Pakistan, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia. These countries
practice some form of Web filtering. We use a standard
IP geolocation database to determine client locations [32].
Clients ran a variety of Web browsers and operating sys-
tems.
7.1 Are measurement tasks sound?
To confirm the soundness of Encore’s measurements, we
built a Web censorship testbed, which has DNS, firewall,
and Web server configurations that emulate seven vari-
eties of DNS, IP, and HTTP filtering. For three months,
we instructed approximately 30% of clients to measure
resources hosted by the testbed (or unfiltered control re-
sources) using the four task types from Table 1. For
example, we verified that the images task type detects
DNS blocking by attempting to load an image from an
invalid domain and observing that the task reports filter-
ing; we verified that the same task successfully loads an
unfiltered image.
Verification is straightforward for the image, style sheet,
and script task types because they give explicit binary
feedback about whether a resource successfully loaded.
Encore collected 8,573 measurements for these task types;
after excluding erroneously contributed measurements
(e.g., from Web crawlers), there were no true positives
and few false positives. For example, clients in India, a
country with notoriously unreliable network connectivity,
contributed to a 5% false positive rate for images.
Verifying soundness of the inline frame task type re-
quires more care because it infers existence of filtering
from the time taken to load resources. Figure 7 com-
pares the time taken to load an uncached versus cached
single pixel image from 1,099 globally distributed En-
core clients. Cached images normally load within a few
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Figure 7: Comparison between load times for cached and un-
cached images from 1,099 Encore clients. Cached images typi-
cally load within tens of milliseconds, whereas uncached usually
take at least 50 ms longer to load, indicated by the bold red line.
We use this difference to infer filtering.
tens of milliseconds, whereas most clients take at least
50 ms longer to load the same image uncached. The few
clients with little difference between cached and uncached
load time were located on the same local network as the
server. Difference in load time will be more pronounced
for larger images and with greater latency between clients
and content.
In both cases, false positives highlight (1) that distin-
guishing Web filtering from other kinds of network prob-
lems is difficult and (2) the importance of collecting many
measurements before drawing strong conclusions about
Web filtering. We now develop a filtering detection algo-
rithm that addresses both concerns.
7.2 Does Encore detect Web filtering?
We instructed the remaining 70% of clients to measure
resources suspected of filtering, with the goal of inde-
pendently verifying Web filtering reported in prior work.
Because measuring Web filtering may place some users
at risk, we only measured Facebook, YouTube, and Twit-
ter. These sites pose little additional risk to users because
browsers already routinely contact them via cross-origin
requests without user consent (e.g., the Facebook “thumbs
up” button, embedded YouTube videos and Twitter feeds).
Expanding our measurements to less popular sites would
require extra care, as we discuss in the next section.
We aimed to detect resources that are consistently in-
accessible from one region, yet still accessible from oth-
ers. For this purpose, we measure filtering of entire do-
mains, using the image task type. This is challenging
because measurement tasks may fail for reasons other
than filtering: clients may experience intermittent net-
work connectivity problems, browsers may incorrectly
execute measurement tasks, sites may themselves go of-
fline, and so on. We use a statistical hypothesis test to
distinguish such sporadic or localized measurement fail-
ures from more consistent failures that might indicate
Web filtering. We model each measurement success as
a Bernoulli random variable with parameter p = 0.7; we
assume that, in the absence of filtering, clients should
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successfully load resources at least 70% of the time. Al-
though this assumption is conservative, it captures our
desire to eliminate false positives, which can easily drown
out true positives when detecting rare events like Web
filtering. For each resource and region, we count both the
total number of measurements nr and the number of suc-
cessful measurements xr and run a one-sided hypothesis
test for a binomial distribution; we consider a resource as
filtered in region r if xr fails this test at 0.05 significance
(i.e., Pr[Binomial(nr, p) ≤ xr] ≤ 0.05) yet does not fail
the same test in other regions.
Applying this technique on preliminary measurements
confirms well-known censorship of youtube.com in
Pakistan, Iran, and China [19], and of twitter.com
and facebook.com in China and Iran. Although our
detection algorithm works well on preliminary data, pos-
sible enhancements include dynamically tuning model
parameters to account for differing false positive rates in
each country and accounting for potential confounding
factors like user behavior differences between browsers
and ISPs [3].
8 Ethics and Security
This section discusses barriers to Encore’s widespread
deployment, from the ethics of collecting measurements
from unsuspecting Web users to the potential for attackers
to block, disrupt, or tamper with client measurements or
collection infrastructure.
Which resources are safe to measure? Encore induces
clients to request URLs that might be incriminating in
some countries and circumstances. In particular, the most
interesting URLs to measure may be those most likely to
get users into trouble for measuring them. Curating a list
of target URLs requires striking a balance between ubiq-
uitous yet uninteresting URLs (e.g., online advertisers,
Google Analytics, Facebook) and obscure URLs that gov-
ernments are likely to censor (e.g., human rights groups).
Although our work does not prescribe a specific use case,
we recognize that deploying a tool like Encore engenders
risks that we need to better understand.
Balancing the benefit and risk of measuring filtering
with Encore is difficult. This paper has made the bene-
fit clear: Encore enables researchers to collect new data
about filtering from a diversity of vantage points that was
previously prohibitively expensive to obtain and coordi-
nate. Ongoing efforts to measure Web filtering would ben-
efit from Encore’s diversity and systematic rigor [9,16,36].
The risk that Encore poses are far more nebulous: laws
against accessing filtered content vary from country to
country, and may be effectively unenforceable given the
ease with which sites (like Encore) can request cross-
origin resources without consent; there is no ground truth
about the legal and safety risks posed by collecting net-
work measurements.
Striking this balance between benefit and risk raises
ethical questions that researchers in computer science
rarely face and that conventional ethical standards do
not address. As such, our understanding of the ethical
implications of collecting measurements using Encore
has evolved, and the set of measurements we collect and
report on has likewise changed to reflect our understand-
ing. Table 2 highlights a few key milestones in Encore’s
deployment, which has culminated in the set of measure-
ments we report on in this paper. The Institutional Review
Boards (IRBs) at both Georgia Tech and Princeton de-
clined to formally review Encore because it does not col-
lect or analyze Personally Identifiable Information (PII)
and is not human subjects research [10]. Yet, Encore is
clearly capable of exposing its users to some level of risk.
Because we do not understand the risks that a tool like
Encore presents, we have focused most of our research
efforts on developing the measurement technology, not on
reporting results from the measurements that we gather.
Other censorship measurement tools have and will con-
tinue to face similar ethical questions, and we believe that
our role as researchers is to lead a responsible dialogue in
the context of these emerging tools.
As part of this ongoing dialogue, we hope that the
community will develop ethical norms that are grounded
in theory, applicable in practice, and informed by ex-
perts. To this end, we have discussed Encore with ethics
experts at the Oxford Internet Institute, the Berkman Cen-
ter, and Citizen Lab, and our follow on work examines
broader ethical concerns of censorship measurement [28].
We have also been working with the organizers of the
SIGCOMM NS Ethics workshop [35], which we helped
solicit, to ensure that its attendees will gain experience
applying principled ethical frameworks to networking
and systems research, a process we hope will result in
more informed and grounded discussions of ethics in our
community.
Schechter [42] surveyed people about the ethics of var-
ious research studies, including Encore, and found that
most people felt that unconstrained use of Encore would
be highly unethical. However, as the report acknowl-
edges, the survey didn’t elaborate on the inherent risks of
browsing any Web page, the potential benefits of research
like Encore, the risks of alternative means of measuring
censorship, or low-risk deployment modes.
Encore underscores the need for stricter cross-origin
security policy [46]. Our work exploits existing weak-
nesses, and if these policies could endanger users then
strengthening those policies is clearly a problem worthy
of further research.
Why not informed consent? The question of whether to
obtain informed consent is more complicated than it might
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Date Event
February 2014 and prior Informal discussions with Georgia Tech IRB conclude that Encore (and similar work) is not human subjects
research and does not merit formal IRB review.
March 13, 2014 – March 24, 2014 Encore begins collecting measurements from real users using a list of over 300 URLs. We’re unsure of the
exact date when collection began because of data loss.
March 18, 2014 We begin discussing Encore’s ethics with a researcher at the Oxford Internet Institute.
April 2, 2014 To combat data sparsity, we configure Encore to only measure favicons [44]. The URLs we removed were a
subset of those we crawled from §5.2.
May 5, 2014 Out of ethical concern, we restrict Encore to measure favicons on only a few sites.
May 7, 2014 Submission to IMC 2014, which includes results derived from our March 13 URL list.
September 17, 2014 Georgia Tech IRB officially declines to review Encore. We requested this review in response to skeptical
feedback from IMC.
September 25, 2014 Submission to NSDI 2015, using our URL list on April 2.
January 30, 2015 Submission to SIGCOMM 2015, using our URL list on May 5.
February 6, 2015 Princeton IRB reaffirms that Encore is not human subjects research. We sought this review at the request of
the SIGCOMM PC chairs after Nick Feamster moved to Princeton.
Table 2: Timeline of Encore measurement collection, ethics discussions, and paper submissions. As our understanding of Encore’s
ethical implications evolved, we increasingly restricted the set of measurements we collect and report. See http://encore.
noise.gatech.edu/urls.html for information on how the set of URLs that Encore measures has evolved over time.
first appear. Informed consent is not always appropriate,
given that in disciplines where experimental protocols for
human subjects research are well-established, there are
classes of experiments that can still be conducted ethi-
cally without it, such as when obtaining consent is either
prohibitive or impractical and there is little appreciable
risk of harm to the subject.
Researchers and engineers who have performed large-
scale network measurements can appreciate that obtaining
consent of any kind is typically impractical. For Encore,
it would require apprising a user about nuanced techni-
cal concepts, such as cross-origin requests and how Web
trackers work—and doing so across language barriers,
no less. Such burdens would dramatically reduce the
scale and scope of measurements, relegating us to the
already extremely dangerous status quo of activists and
researchers who put themselves into harm’s way to study
censorship. Even if we could somehow obtain consent
at scale, informed consent does not ever decrease risk to
users; it only alleviates researchers from some responsi-
bility for that risk, and may even increase risk to users by
removing any traces of plausible deniability.
We believe researchers should instead focus on reduc-
ing risk to uninformed users, as we have done with re-
peated iteration after consultation with ethics experts. It
is generally accepted that users already have little con-
trol over or knowledge of much of the traffic that their
Web browsers and devices generate (a point raised by
Princeton’s office of research integrity and assurance),
which already gives users reasonable cover. By analogy,
the prevalence of malware and third-party trackers itself
lends credibility to the argument that a user cannot rea-
sonably control the traffic that their devices send. The
more widespread measurements like Encore become, the
less risky they are for users.
Filtering access to Encore infrastructure. Clients can
only use Encore if they can fetch a measurement task. If
the domain (or URL) that hosts measurement tasks is itself
blocked, clients will not be able to execute measurements.
Once a client retrieves a measurement task, subsequent
requests appear as ordinary cross-origin requests; as a re-
sult, the main concern is ensuring that clients can retrieve
measurement tasks in the first place.
The server that dispatches tasks could be replicated
across many domains to make it more difficult for a
censor to block Encore by censoring a single domain.
Clients could contact the coordination server indirectly
via an intermediary or create mirrors of the coordina-
tion server in shared hosting environments (e.g., Amazon
AWS), thereby increasing the collateral damage of block-
ing a mirror. Going further, webmasters could contact
the coordination server on behalf of clients (e.g., with a
WordPress plugin or Django package) by querying the
coordination server and including the returned measure-
ment task directly in the page it serves to the client; to
increase scalability and decrease latency, servers could
cache several tasks in advance. Similarly, collection of
the results could be distributed across servers hosted in
different domains, to ensure that collection is not blocked.
There are limits to Encore’s ability to withstand such
attacks. Because it runs entirely within a Web browser,
Encore cannot leverage stronger security tools like Tor to
anonymously report measurements [13, 45].
Detecting and interfering with Encore measurements.
Blocking Encore based on the contents of measurement
tasks (e.g., via deep packet inspection) should be dif-
ficult, because we can easily disguise tasks’ code us-
ing JavaScript obfuscation or detection evasion tech-
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niques [14, 26]. Identifying task behavior is equally dif-
ficult because it appears merely as requests to load a
cross-origin object—something many Web sites do under
normal operation. If a single client performs a sequence
of cross-origin requests that appear unrelated to the con-
tent of the host site, a censor may recognize the sequence
as unusual and either block the subsequent reports or
otherwise attempt to distort the results. We expect such
interference to be relatively difficult, however, since a
censor would first have to identify a sequence of requests
as a measurement attempt and interpose on subsequent
requests to interfere with the reports. Although such in-
terference is plausible, censors do not generally interfere
with measurements today, so we leave this consideration
to future work.
Attackers may attempt to submit poisoned measure-
ment results to alter the conclusions that Encore draws
about censorship. We could try to employ reputation
systems to thwart such attacks, although it would be prac-
tically impossible to completely prevent such poisoning
from untrusted clients [22].
9 Conclusion
Despite the importance of measuring the extent and na-
ture of Internet censorship, doing so is difficult because
it requires deploying a large number of geographically
diverse vantage points, and recruiting volunteers for such
a deployment is a significant deployment hurdle. This pa-
per presents an alternate approach: rather than requiring
users to install custom measurement software, we take ad-
vantage of the fact that users’ Web browsers can perform
certain types of cross-origin requests, which we can har-
ness to induce measurements of reachability to arbitrary
third-party domains. Although only a limited amount
of information about the success of these requests leaks
across domains, even a small amount of leakage turns
out to be enough to permit inferences about the reachabil-
ity of higher-level Web resources, including both entire
domains and specific URLs.
Encore shifts the deployment burden from clients to
webmasters. We have designed Encore so that deploy-
ment is simple (in many cases, webmasters only add one
line to the main Web page source). We also point out that
many webmasters are typically interested in monitoring
the reachability of their sites from various client geogra-
phies and networks in any case, so deployment incentives
are well-aligned.
Although the types of measurements Encore can per-
form may be more definitive than tools that rely on in-
formal user reports (e.g., Herdict), Encore may draw far
fewer conclusions about the scope and methods of censor-
ship than tools that measure censorship methods in detail
(e.g., OONI, Centinel). Ultimately, censorship measure-
ment is a complex, moving target, and no single measure-
ment method or tool can paint a complete picture. What is
sorely missing from the existing set of measurement tools,
however, is a way to characterize censorship practices in
broad strokes, based on a sizeable and continuous set of
client measurements. By filling this important hole in
our understanding, Encore can help bridge the gap be-
tween diverse yet inconclusive user reports and detailed
yet narrow or short-term fine-grained measurements.
The prospect of using Encore to collect measurements
from unsuspecting users has already stirred controversy
within the networking community and prompted a wider
dialogue on ethics of network measurement [35]. Forth-
coming guidelines for ethical measurement will hope-
fully help determine whether we can deploy Encore more
widely. Our work is beneficial regardless: If wider de-
ployment is appropriate, this paper has explained how
Encore could yield valuable insight on Web censorship at
a previously unattainable scale; if ethical concerns make
further deployment infeasible, our work is evidence that
attackers could use tools like Encore to place users in
harm’s way and that perhaps cross-origin security policy
should be strengthened to prevent such attacks.
A Example of a measurement task
This is a complete example of JavaScript code that runs
in a client’s Web browser to measure Web filtering us-
ing cross-origin embedding of a hidden image. It uses
jQuery [29]. The coordination server minifies and obfus-
cates the source code before sending it to a client.
See http://goo.gl/l8GU0R for a simple demo
of Encore’s cross-origin request mechanism.
var M = Object();
// A measurement ID is a unique identifier
// linking all submissions of a measurement.
M.measurementId = ... // a UUID.
// This function embeds an image from a remote
// origin, hides it, and sets up callbacks to
// detect success or failure to load the image.
M.measure = function() {
var img = $(’<img>’);
img.attr(’src’, ’//target/image.png’);
img.style(’display’, ’none’);
img.on(’load’, M.sendSuccess);
img.on(’error’, M.sendFailure);
img.appendTo(’html’);
}
// This function submits a result using
// a cross-origin AJAX request. The server
// must allow such cross-origin submissions.
M.submitToCollector = function(state) {
$.ajax({
url: "//collector/submit" +
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"?cmh-id=" + this.measurementId +
"&cmh-result=" + state,
});
}
M.sendSuccess = function() {
M.submitToCollector("success");
}
M.sendFailure = function() {
M.submitToCollector("failure");
}
// Submit to the server as soon as the client
// loads the page, regardless of the
// measurement result. This indcates which
// clients attempted to run the measurement,
// even if they don’t submit a final result.
M.submitToCollector("init");
// Run the measurement when the page loads.
$(M.measure);
B SIGCOMM Signing Statement
A version of this paper was published in SIGCOMM
2015 [7] and is accompanied by the following statement
from the SIGCOMM Program Committee:
The SIGCOMM 2015 PC appreciated the technical con-
tributions made in this paper, but found the paper con-
troversial because some of the experiments the authors
conducted raise ethical concerns. The controversy arose
in large part because the networking research community
does not yet have widely accepted guidelines or rules
for the ethics of experiments that measure online cen-
sorship. In accordance with the published submission
guidelines for SIGCOMM 2015, had the authors not en-
gaged with their Institutional Review Boards (IRBs) or
had their IRBs determined that their research was unethi-
cal, the PC would have rejected the paper without review.
But the authors did engage with their IRBs, which did
not flag the research as unethical. The PC hopes that
discussion of the ethical concerns these experiments raise
will advance the development of ethical guidelines in this
area. It is the PC’s view that future guidelines should
include as a core principle that researchers should not
engage in experiments that subject users to an appreciable
risk of substantial harm absent informed consent. The PC
endorses neither the use of the experimental techniques
this paper describes nor the experiments the authors con-
ducted.
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